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Abstract
Over the last two decades, discoveries made in the field of cognitive neuroscience 
have begun to permeate the humanities and social sciences. In the context of this 
intersection, Neurofilmology is a research program that arises at the encounter 
between two models of viewer: the viewer-as-mind (deriving from a cognitive/
analytical approach) and the viewer-as-body (typical of the phenomenological/
continental approach). Accordingly, Neurofilmology focuses on the viewer-as-
organism, by investigating with both empirical and speculative epistemological 
tools the subject of audiovisual experience, postulated as embodied, embedded, 
enacted, extended, emerging, affective, and relational. This introduction is di-
vided into three parts. Firstly, it compares the classic filmological approach of the 
1940s-50s with contemporary audiovisual media studies devoted to the analysis 
of viewer experience. Secondly, it outlines an epistemological and conceptual 
framework for the research: in this sense, it illustrates the theoretical model of 
the viewer-as-organism, and sketches a general outline of audiovisual experience 
that allows researchers to rearrange different kinds of research within a unitary 
framework. Thirdly, it briefly summarizes the contributions to the special issue.
This special issue of Cinéma & Cie focuses on major conceptual and epis-
temological arguments arising from the dialogue between audiovisual studies 
and neurosciences developed over the last twenty years. In fact, the contribu-
tors share the conviction that such a dialogue can be fruitful if and only if it is 
conducted within a common and consistent framework, including both episte-
mological and conceptual aspects. Such a framework should allow each of the 
research programs to contribute to a shared understanding of that particular 
and complex phenomenon that is the film and audiovisual media viewing ex-
perience. Therefore, this introduction will both illustrate the main difficulties 
involved in the dialogue between audiovisual studies and neurosciences, and 
propose a methodological and conceptual framework for underpinning and 
girding interdisciplinary research projects.
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In doing so, we assume a twofold orientation. On the one hand, our proposal 
looks to the contemporary research fields crossing film theory and experimen-
tal sciences – such as “psychocinematics,” “neurocinematics,” “neurocognitive 
film and media theory,” or “film neuroaesthetics.” The framework we propose 
is integrative, rather than alternative; more exactly, we intend to overcome some 
oppositions between different conceptions of audiovisual experience, under-
lying and undermining the dialogue between audiovisual theory and experi-
mental sciences. On the other hand, our proposal looks to the past and more 
particularly to Filmology, the research program that during the 1950s and the 
1960s intersected for the first time theoretical and empirical approaches within 
a systematic investigation of film viewing experience. Although largely forgot-
ten by current psychocinematic studies, Filmology nevertheless constitutes a 
key anticipation of current issues and debates – as well as of contemporary 
limits and problems of interdisciplinary collaborations. We will label our epis-
temological and theoretical framework Neurofilmology.
The first part of this introduction is dedicated to an analysis of both the clas-
sic filmological approach and the contemporary landscape of interdisciplinary 
studies on audiovisual experience. The second part illustrates our proposal both 
in epistemological and in conceptual terms, and outlines a theoretical model of 
audiovisual experience. The third part briefly presents the individual contribu-
tions to this special issue.
The (problematic) heritage of classic Filmology
Cette diversité des thèmes traités dans notre Revue marquera utilement, non pas le li-
mites, mais l’étendue du champ des études filmologiques et rendra sensible la nécessité, 
pour ces études, de méthodes d’investigation très diverses, et par suite d’équipes de tra-
vailleurs multiples et variées, et la mise en jeu d’outillages complexes et spécialisés. No-
tre discipline exigera, pour que soit réalisé son programme, que nous ne saurions encore 
définir et limiter, la convergence de ces méthodes et l’harmonisation de ces curiosités.1
Reading Mario Roques’ Introduction to the Revue Internationale de Filmologie 
issue no. 16 (January-March 1954), entirely devoted to Études expérimentales 
de l’activité nerveuse pendant la projection du film, one can say that, even after 
exactly sixty years, things have changed little. The dark fascination of the brain 
and the nerves still tempt audiovisual studies, constantly in search of empirical 
evidence to solve the ineffable mystery of film viewing. The yellowed pages of 
that issue, equipped with figures of the mu rhythm (i.e. a type of brain wave that 
can be measured via electroencephalography) of the experiments reported, are a 
* The authors would like to thank Warren Buckland for his helpful advice and comments on 
various arguments in this Introduction.
1 Revue Internationale de Filmologie, no. 16, “Études expérimentales de l’activité nerveuse pendant 
la projection du film,” January-March 1954.
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sort of archaeological evidence – the fossil witness of a past age in which meth-
odology, prior to even phenomena, was a field of experimentation.
The Filmology manifesto was experimental in itself, due to the intrinsic interdis-
ciplinarity that characterized the filmological research project as a whole. Accord-
ing to Gilbert Cohen-Séat’s Essai sur les principes d’une philosophie du cinéma,2 a 
serious and systematic study of cinema and a comprehensive analysis of the “cin-
ematic fact” and “filmic fact” were essential to found an autonomous and specific 
discipline, accountable for the complexity of the film “enterprise” as both a social 
and a psychological object. The co-operation of sociologists, aesthetologists, phi-
losophers, experimental and developmental psychologists, and physiologists was 
the very revolutionary specificity of the new discipline, established on the inte-
grated contribution of different perspectives and methodologies. 
However, as several commentators recognize today, this project lacked an ad-
equate methodological and conceptual framework that would have been able to 
unify and coordinate the different scholars’ efforts and accordingly to shift from 
a pluri-disciplinary to a real inter-disciplinary setting. As a consequence, the posi-
tivist premises of Filmology pushed it towards a predominance of experimental 
sciences (as opposed to philosophical and culturalist disciplines) and of a be-
havioural approach (as opposed to phenomenological and even psychoanalytical 
ones).3 Issue no. 16 of the Revue de Filmologie, introduced above, is a perfect 
example of this overall trend.
Indeed, that issue consists of the report of three experiments conducted by 
three different teams (only Gilbert Cohen-Séat is accredited in the all three),4 as 
the outcome of the work of one of the four domaines d’études promoted at the 
Institut de Filmologie (founded by Cohen-Séat at Sorbonne University in 1947).5 
2 Gilbert Cohen-Séat, Essai sur les principes d’une philosophie du cinéma. Tome I. “Introduction 
générale. Notions fondamentales et vocabulaire de filmologie,” PUF, Paris 1946.
3 See particularly Martin Lefebvre, “L’aventure filmologique: documents et jalons d’une histoire 
institutionnelle,” in Cinémas: revue d’études cinématographiques / Cinémas: Journal of Film Studies, 
vol. 19, no. 2-3, “La filmologie, de nouveau,” sous la direction de François Albera et Martin Lefe-
bvre, 2009, pp. 59-100; and Laurent Jullier, “‘L’esprit, et peut-être meme le cerveau…’ La question 
psychologique dans la Revue internationale de filmologie, 1947-1962,” Ivi, pp. 143-167. See also 
Zbigniew Gawrak, “La filmologie: bilan de la naissance jusqu’au 1958,” in Ikon, no. 65-66, 1968, 
pp. 111-118; Christian Metz, Langage et Cinéma, Larousse, Paris 1971 (Language and Cinema, 
Mouton, The Hague-Paris 1974, pp. 9-21); Edward Lowry, The Filmology Movement and Film 
Study in France, University of Michigan Research Press, Ann Arbor 1985, particularly pp. 157-170; 
Francesco Casetti, Theories of Cinema, 1945-1995, The University of Texas Press, Austin 1999, pp. 
94-106; David Rodowick, Elegy for theory, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA)-London 
2014, pp. 112-130.
4 Gilbert Cohen-Séat, Henry Gastaut, Jacque Bert, “Modification de l’E.E.G. pendant la projec-
tion cinématographique,” in Revue Internationale de Filmologie, no. 16, cit., pp. 7-26; Gilbert 
Cohen-Séat, Jacques Faure, “Retentissement du ‘fait filmique’ sur les rythmes bioélectriques du 
cerveau,” in Ivi, pp. 27-50; Georges Heuyer, Gilbert Cohen-Séat, Serge Lebovici, Monique Rebeil-
lard, M.lle Daveau, “Note sur l’électroencéphalographie pendant la projection cinématographique 
chez des adolescents inadaptés,” in Ivi, pp. 51-64.
5 The four domains were: études psychologiques, directed by Henri Wallon; études techniques, 
directed by Gilbert Cohen-Séat, filmologie générale et philosophie directed by Raymond Bayer, 
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The aim of these innovative – for that age, at least – studies was to demonstrate 
and measure viewers’ psychophysiological response to “experimental” films – 
made specifically for these studies – or short sound films, by means of electroen-
cephalograms (EEG). Differently from the investigation of “latent consequences 
of the cinematographic projection,”6 the EEG 
permet au moins de déceler, par la manifestation objective des variations du potentiel 
de l’électricité somatique, l’existence de certaines réactions. Elle peut donc offrir une 
méthode concrète pour comparer certains états au cours de la projection filmique.7
Rather than anything that they might reveal, what was so innovative about 
these experiments was the existence of the responses, and that they could be 
measured objectively by means of a relatively new instrument. The main discov-
ery of the use of EEG was the fact that desynchronization of mu waves occurs 
not only during active movements of the subject, but also while the subject ob-
serves actions executed by someone else, even when this someone else is not a 
real person, but a film character.
This “concrete method,” however, is subject to the same scepticism that em-
pirical methodology raises today when applied to humanities. Roques himself, 
in fact, notes two critical aspects. First, the uncertainty of the EEG techniques 
forces researchers to “hide behind” descriptions and anatomical-neurological 
hypothesis that make interpretation “insufficiently clear.”8 Second, the fact that 
these studies seem not to refer directly to filmological aspects or to have applica-
tions to filmological dynamics. The main problem – Roques comments – is the 
difficulty of introducing in the laboratory a set of stimulus equivalent to that 
normally specific to real life. These experiments were recreated in a context that 
nor fully correspond to the “cinematographic situation,” i.e. the spatial and psy-
chological conditions that make the film experience powerfully “empathetic.” 
The words “real” and “empathy” are not used by chance or in their general 
sense; rather, they implicitly refer to two key essays published in the Revue by 
Albert Michotte in previous years. In Le caractère de ‘réalité’ des projections 
cinématographiques9 the Belgian experimental psychologist explained that the 
strong impression of reality provided by the film depends on movement, i.e. a 
factor that gives “life,” a body, to the onscreen objects and that is perceived as 
real in itself. In La participation émotionnelle du spectateur à l’action représentée 
and études comparatives directed by Mario Roques.
6 Mario Roques, “Introduction,” in Revue Internationale de Filmologie, no. 16, “Études expéri-
mentales de l’activité nerveuse pendant la projection du film,” cit., p. 3. 
7 Ivi, p. 4.
8 Ivi, p. 5.
9 Albert Michotte, “Le caractère de ‘réalité’ des projections cinématographiques,” in Revue Inter-
nationale de Filmologie, no. 3-4, 1948, pp. 249-261 (The character of “reality” of cinematographic 
projections, in Georges Thinès, Alan Costall, George Butterworth [eds.], Michotte’s Experimental 
Phenomenology of Perception, Hillsdale [NJ], Erlbaum 1991, pp. 197-209).
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à l’écran. Essai d’une théorie10 Michotte completed his theory of participation 
by perception, suggesting an intimate and mutually dependent relation between 
motor and emotional responses of the viewer to the motor and emotional activ-
ity of the film character.
Whereas Michotte’s background was in Gestalt theory and causalism, the 
behaviouristic character of Cohen-Séat’s EEG experiments is undeniable. The 
behavioural foundation of these studies was to justify, theoretically, the filmo-
logical thesis that the cinema affects and modifies the modes of perception and 
judgement; and, strategically, to stress the “conditioning” potential of the film: 
“Le film peut également être considéré comme un agent conditionnant, capable 
de modifier les réponses aux événements à venir.”11 
In conclusion, Filmology established a dialogue between empirical sciences 
and humanities in order to both conceptualize and analyze the film viewing ex-
perience; however, the inadequacy of its epistemological foundation condemned 
Filmology to a theoretical and practical impasse. In our opinion, it is necessary 
today to recover the filmological challenge, while avoiding filmological errors. 
Accordingly, the contemporary dialogue between hard sciences and humani-
ties should develop within a shared and consistent epistemological framework. 
Therefore, the construction of such a framework will be the first aim of a con-
temporary “neurofilmogical” enterprise.
The (problematic) landscape of contemporary neurological-oriented audiovisual studies
Although the filmological tradition has remained largely unknown until recent 
times, a “new” dialogue between audiovisual theory and neurological sciences 
has nevertheless been progressively arising over the last twenty years. We cannot 
here reconstruct in detail the events that led to such a “neurological turn” in film 
10 Albert Michotte, “La participation émotionnelle du spectateur à l’action représentée à l’écran. 
Essai d’une théorie,” in Revue Internationale de Filmologie, no. 13, 1953, pp. 87-96 (The Emotional 
Involvement of the Spectator in the Action Represented in a Film: Toward a Theory, in Georges 
Thinès, Alan Costall, George Butterworth [eds.], Michotte’s Experimental Phenomenology of Per-
ception, cit., pp. 209-217).
11 Gilbert Cohen-Séat, Gilbert Lelord, “Étude expérimentale des procédés cinématographiques 
comme agents de conditionnement,” in Revue international de filmologie, no. 34, 1960, p. 11. 
As Massimo Locatelli notes, “It is striking […] the fact that the results of EEG-research could 
coherently answer different needs exactly at the same time. It responded to a widespread fear 
of modernity, which could be thus technologically mastered; the pedagogical apprehension for a 
changing, mediatized juvenile lifeworld; and the scientific anxiety to classify and sort out bodily 
experience, including the old, fascinating and mysterious experience of dreaming” (Filmological 
Fallacies. EEG-Research and the Sleeping Beauty, in Alberto Beltrame, Giuseppe Fidotta, Andrea 
Mariani [eds.], At the Borders of (Film) History. Temporality, Archaeology, Theories, Forum, Udine 
forthcoming). It is not by chance, therefore, that, as Lefebvre reconstructs, in the 1950s-60s this 
was a notable aspect in the field of theory of mass communication and that attracted the attention 
of state governments (Martin Lefebvre, “L’aventure filmologique,” cit., p. 75).
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and media studies; rather we will limit ourselves to outlining the two different 
theoretical perspectives that have been primarily responsible for such a trend.
The first perspective focuses on the spectator’s experience as mental activ-
ity. Departing from linguistics, semiotics, psychoanalysis (the so-called “Grand-
Theory”), American psychologists and philosophers proposed to adopt a post-
computational cognitivist perspective to describe the ways film is mentally 
understood by the spectator. In the 1990s, this focus on a disembodied, mental 
experience of film has been consolidated, although the specific focus has shifted 
from narration to those of emotions and visual perception, the latter under the 
ecological perspective.12
A second, alternative model of spectatorship has been developed by authors 
who refer the description of aesthetic experience to phenomenological philoso-
phy, with particular reference to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notion of embodied 
perception.13 To Bordwell’s lapidary statement, “the spectator thinks” through 
a mind, phenomenologists would reply that “the spectator feels” through a 
body intended as the site of perceptual synaesthetic fluxes of both affections 
and thoughts. In this direction, the “Deleuzian turn” in film studies, focusing 
on the “logic of sensations” implied in the spectator experience, produced rich 
theoretical insights.14
12 References in this field are too many to be mentioned in detail. We limit to signal a number of 
both “classic” and recent readers: David Bordwell, Noël Carroll (eds.), Post-Theory: Reconstruct-
ing Film Studies, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison 1996; Carl Plantinga, Gregory M. Smith 
(eds.), Passionate Views: Thinking about Film and Emotion, Johns Hopkins University Press, Bal-
timore 1997; Richard Allen, Murray Smith (eds.), Film Theory and Philosophy, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1997; Thomas E. Wartenberg, Angela Curran (eds.), The Philosophy of Film. Introductory 
Text and Readings, Blackwell - Wiley, Malden (MA) 2005; Noël Carroll, Jinhee Choi (eds.), Philoso-
phy of Film and Motion Pictures. An Anthology, Blackwell, Malden (MA) 2006; Joseph Anderson, 
Barbara Anderson (eds.), Narration and Spectatorship in Moving Images: Perception, Imagination, 
Emotion, Cambridge Scholar Press, Newcastle 2007; Paisley Livingston, Carl Plantinga (eds.), The 
Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film, Routledge, London-New York 2009; Amy Coplan, 
Peter Goldie (eds.), Empathy: Philosophycal and Psychological Perspectives, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford - New York 2011; Ted Nannicelli, Paul Taberham (eds.), Cognitive Media Theory, 
Routledge, New York - London 2014; Michael J. Grabowski (ed.), Neuroscience and Media. New 
Understandings and Representations, Routledge, London-New York 2015.
13 The main reference is Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of the Film 
Experience, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1992. See also the work of – among others – 
Laura Marks and Steven Shaviro.
14 See Gilles Deleuze, L’image-mouvement. Cinéma 1, Minuit, Paris 1983 (Cinema 1. The Move-
ment-Image, The Athlone Press, London 1986); Id., L’image-temps. Cinéma 2, Minuit, Paris 1985 
(Cinema 2. The Time-Image, The Athlone Press, London 1989); Id., The Brain is the Screen, in G. 
Flaxman (ed), The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema, University of Min-
nesota Press, Minneapolis 2000, pp. 365-373 and the works of – among others – Raymond Bel-
lour, David N. Rodowick, Brian Massumi. See also Robert Pepperell, Michael Punt (eds.), Screen 
consciousness. Cinema, Mind and World, Rodopi, New York 2006; Jérôme Game (ed.), Images des 
corps/corps des images au cinéma, ENS Éditions, Paris 2010. On the epistemological problems 
implied by an integration of Deleuzian approach within the phenomenological framework, see 
Elena del Rio, Cinema, in Hans Rainer Sepp, Lester Embree (eds.), Handbook of Phenomenological 
Aesthetics, Springer, Dordrech-Heidelberg-London-New York 2010, pp. 111-118.
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The cognitivist and the phenomenological perspective set up a dialogue with 
neurosciences in relatively different ways and without a strict reciprocal confron-
tation; as a consequence, we find today different and not-immediately compat-
ible models of film spectatorship.
Within cognitivist studies of film, the development of neuroscientific-based 
models for the study of spectatorship is part of the project of “psychocinematics”15 
as a natural evolution of the centrality attributed to attention, simulation, empa-
thy/sympathy, intentionality and emotions by cognitivist film scholars. Psycho-
cinematic studies show that processing of film is firmly rooted in psychologi-
cal and biological characteristics of our species, and favours empirical research. 
However, as Charles Forceville notes in his review of Arthur P. Shimamura’s 
book, included in this issue, “the volume convincingly shows how cognitivist 
approaches and psychocinematics are natural allies, and demonstrates fine op-
portunities for collaboration between film scholars, psychologists and brain re-
searchers,” yet it “has actually less to say (pace Shimamura) on the aesthetics of 
film viewing than on how film is understood.”16
Phenomenological studies meanwhile argue that the fundamental (and con-
troversial) insight behind neuroscientific findings is that the complex processes 
of the human mind find in the brain’s architecture and functioning their neural 
correlates. This correlation is based on a functional link between observation of 
goal-directed actions or emotions and sensorimotor activation of the observer.17 
In particular, the philosophical and psychological implications of the function 
of so-called “visuomotor neurons” have caused a breakthrough in the under-
standing of the mind-body relation and of phenomena such as human conscious-
ness, empathy, intersubjectivity, affect, and aesthetic response to works of art. 
Unity of action and perception is allowed by an embodied simulation, a basic 
functional mechanism by means of which our brain-body system models its in-
teractions with the world.18 This proposal falls fully within the paradigm of em-
bodied cognition, according to which cognition depends upon those experiences 
“that come from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities [that] are 
themselves embedded in more encompassing biological, psychological and cul-
tural context.”19 In turn, this paradigm is based on both a phenomenological ac-
15 Arthur P. Shimamura (ed.), Psychocinematics: Exploring Cognition at the Movies, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, New York-Oxford 2013.
16 See infra in the book reviews section.
17 Giacomo Rizzolatti, Corrado Sinigaglia, Mirrors in the Brain: How Our Minds Share Actions and 
Emotions, Oxford University Press, Cambridge (MA) 2008; Marco Iacoboni, Mirroring people: 
The Science of Empathy and How We Connect with Others, Picador, New York 2009.
18 See Vittorio Gallese, Alvin I. Goldman, “Mirror Neurons and the Simulation Theory,” in Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 2, no. 12, 1998, pp. 493-501; Vittorio Gallese, “Embodied Simulation: 
From Neurons to Phenomenal Experience,” in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, no. 
4, 2005, pp. 23-48; Id., “Mirror Neurons, Embodied Simulation, and the Neural Basis of Social 
Identification,” in Psychoanalytic Dialogues, no. 19, 2009, pp. 519-536.
19 Francisco J. Varela, Eleanor Thompson, Evan Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and 
Human Experience, MIT Press, Boston 1991. See also George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Philosophy in 
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count of the body and human experience and on the ecological approach to visual 
perception. Phenomenological film theory still seems to harbour some resistance 
to neurophenomenology,20 although the search for a post-dualistic neurological 
foundation of the film experience could allow it to overcome continental philoso-
phy’s rejection of natural science. The study of the neural substratum of the film 
experience arises as a terrain of encounter and dialogue between cognitive and 
phenomenological film studies.21
A first outcome of the dialogue between audiovisual theory and neurosciences 
is thus the forced cohabitation of different models of film viewer. A second out-
come is a forced “naturalization” of the film viewing situation as the result of the 
anti-culturalist trend unifying cognitivist and phenomenological perspectives, as 
well as of theoretical premises implied by empirical research methods. Indeed, 
some neuroscientists not only consider cinema as a metaphor for the human 
mind,22 but also carry out neuroimaging tests on audiences, aiming to outline 
a “neurocinematics.”23 For instance, in his pioneering study Uri Hasson et al. 
acknowledge that neuroimaging methods may serve as “an objective scientific 
measurement for assessing the effect of distinctive styles of filmmaking upon the 
brain, and therefore substantiate theoretical claims made in relation to them,”24 
despite the fact that they cannot provide an aesthetic judgment on the cinematic 
style from a “naturalistic” point of view. More broadly, neurocinematic approach 
promises a naturalistic account of a series of phenomena (from film style to film 
genre system) previously explained by culturalist tools. 
In conclusion, in the wake of its dialogue with neurosciences, the contem-
porary landscape of audiovisual studies appears today to be split by a twofold 
antinomy: on the one hand, we find an opposition between viewer-as-mind and 
the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought, Basic Books, New York 1999.
20 See Francisco J. Varela, “Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Prob-
lem,” in Journal of Consciousness Studies, no. 3, 1996, pp. 330-349.
21 See for example Vittorio Gallese, Michele Guerra, “Embodying Movies,” in Cinema: Journal of 
Philosophy and the Moving Image, no. 3, 2012; Adriano D’Aloia, Cinematic Empathies. Spectator 
involvement in the film experience, in Matthew Reason, Dee Reynolds (eds.), Kinesthetic Empathy 
in Creative and Cultural Practices, Intellect, Bristol 2012, pp. 91-108; Id., “The Intangible Ground: 
A Neurophenomenology of the Film Experience,” in Necsus, no. 2, 2012, pp. 219-239; Id., La 
vertigine e il volo. L’esperienza filmica fra estetica e neuroscienze cognitive, Fondazione Ente dello 
Spettacolo, Roma 2013; Maarten Coëgnarts, Peter Kravanja (eds.), Embodied Cognition and Cin-
ema, Leuven University Press, Leuven 2015.
22 Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, G.P. Putnam/
Avon Books, New York 1994; Id., The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making 
of Consciousness, Harcourt Brace, New York-San Diego 1999.
23 Uri Hasson, Orit Furman, Dav Clark, Yadin Dudai, Lila Davachi, “Enhanced Intersubject Cor-
relations During Movie Viewing Correlate with Successful Episodic Encoding,” in Neuron, vol. 57, 
no. 3, 2008, pp. 452-462. See also Uri Hasson, Ohad Landesman, Barbara Knappmeyer, Ignacio 
Vallines, Nava Rubin, David J. Heeger, “Neurocinematics: The Neuroscience of Film,” in Projec-
tions. The Journal for Movies and Mind, no. 1, 2008, pp. 1-26.
24 Uri Hasson et al., “Neurocinematics: The Neuroscience of Film,” cit., p. 1.
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viewer-as-body models; on the other one, a contrast between a naturalistic-ori-
ented versus a culturalist-oriented vision of the film viewing situation is evident.
An epistemological toolbox
From this section, we start the second part of the introduction, devoted to the 
proposal of a neurofilmological perspective. As we said, Neurofilmology aims to 
establish a unified and consistent framework for both theoretical and empirical 
current research programs on the film viewer experience. To achieve this objective, 
and on the basis of previous considerations and statements, we need to take four 
steps. First, we have to highlight a set of epistemological principles, with the aim of 
promoting and governing the exchange of theories and models between theoreti-
cal and empirical disciplines; second, we have to tackle and try to overcome the op-
position between a mental versus an embodied model of viewer; third, we have to 
cope with and try to bridge the gap between a natural versus a socio-cultural model 
of the viewing situation; finally, we can sketch a model of audiovisual experience as 
a conceptual framework for both actual and possible research projects.
As we have seen, the dialogue between the “three cultures”25 – i.e. natural 
sciences, social sciences and humanities – is a key problem for both classical fil-
mology and contemporary film theory.26 Our position in this regard is that of an 
epistemological pluralism, that is, a not necessarily ontological anti-reductionism. 
The same states-of-things (i.e. the film viewing situation) can be described, and 
the same phenomena (i.e. viewer’s perceptual, cognitive, emotional, etc. process-
es) can be understood and explained by different research programs at different 
levels (i.e. neurological, psychological, phenomenological, etc.) without neces-
sarily implying a determining relationship between these levels. Such coexistence 
of different research programs should be governed by three principles.
The first principle is a common operational mechanism of different research 
programs. Indeed, the methods of theoretical disciplines and those of the em-
pirical sciences are closer than it seems at first glance. On the one hand, experi-
25 Jerome Kagan, The Three Cultures. Natural Sciences, Social Sciences, and the Humanities in the 
21st Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (MA)-New York 2009. In this Introduction 
we will leave aside the problem of a dialogue with social sciences, which was nevertheless a central 
issue of classic Filmology.
26 See for instance the discussion on the “naturalization” and “scientism” of film theory in David N. 
Rodowick, Philosophy’s Artful Conversation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) - London 
2015; for a survey see Ted Nannicelli, Paul Taberham (eds.), Cognitive Media Theory, cit. Two 
updated accounts of the problem of reductionism are Jennifer Lackey, Testimonial Knowledge, in 
Sven Bernecker, Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, London - 
New York, 2011, pp. 316-325; and Sven Walter, Marcus Eronen, Reduction, Multiple Realizability 
and Levels of Reality, in Steven French, Juha Saatsi (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to the 
Philosophy of Science, Bloomsbury, London-New Delhi 2014, pp. 138-156. In the aesthetic field, 
see Joseph Margolis, The Cultural Space of the Arts and the Infelicities of Reductionism, Columbia 
University Press, New York 2010.
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mental procedures of the hard sciences proceed from backgrounds composed of 
theories, models, taken-for-granted assumptions (which in turn depend on ex-
perimental protocols, technical constraints, and sometimes utilitarian interests); 
these backgrounds are highly responsible for final results, while in turn these 
findings can confirm, deny or modify the original theoretical background. On 
the other hand, theoretical reflection is also based on experimental processes: 
the researchers test their hypotheses on their own experience, and therefore uses 
themselves as objects of experimentation, through a chiastic oscillation from first 
to third person and back.
The second principle is that of declarativeness: every scientific approach to the 
cinema viewer should set and state their premises, i.e. their models, methods, 
the technologies being used, the level of state-of-things that will be analysed, the 
time and space scale of the phenomena approached and accordingly the time 
and space windows investigated.27
The third principle is that of shared hermeneutics: each of the different re-
search programs should be willing to redefine its own theoretical background on 
the basis of pertinent findings reported by other programs. In this respect, we 
can find three possibilities:
1) The theoretical backgrounds, the models and the results of a research pro-
gram are incommensurable, and therefore neither compatible nor incompatible 
with those of another program. This possibility typically occurs when research 
programs investigate different time (or space) windows. For example, the findings 
of neurological research relating to perceptual narrower time windows and sub-
conscious mechanisms can neither be confirmed nor denied by a phenomenologi-
cal approach, which works on a conscious (or bearable to consciousness) level. 
2) Theories, models and results from different research programs are com-
mensurable, yet compatible. For example, the findings of neurological research 
on connections between visual perception and motor and pre-motor neurons 
activation, match with ecological and enactive theories of visual perception (see 
above). In these cases, evidence from one research program intersect with evi-
dence from other programs, in a sort of “triangulation” that both corroborates 
the findings and illuminates not immediately obvious aspects of each level.28
3) The third possibility, which is the most interesting for the advancement of 
27 We think on the one hand to a “rational reconstruction” of research programs, on the model 
of Warren Buckland, Film Theory. Rational Reconstructions, Routledge, London-New York 2014; 
and on the other hand to a consideration of the programs as forms of “science in action” (see 
Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge [MA] 1987) within a well-defined social, cultural and political world, 
on the model proposed for neurosciences by Suparna Choudhury, Jan Slaby (eds.), Critical Neuro-
science. A Handbook of the Social and Cultural Contexts of Neuroscience, Wiley-Blackwell, Malden 
(MA)-Oxford-Chichester 2012.
28 Murray Smith, Triangulating Aesthetic Experience, in Arthur P. Shimamura, Stephen E. Pal-
mer (eds.), Aesthetic Science. Connecting Minds, Brains, and Experience, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford-New York 2012, pp. 80-106.
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research capable of causing the “scientific revolutions,”29 is that theories, models 
and findings of a given research program appear commensurable but not compat-
ible with those of another one. As a consequence, the research community has 
to make a choice, whose policy is to prefer the theoretical framework that has a 
greater explanatory and predictive power, and that is at the same time as simple 
as possible. This theoretical framework could be either one of those in play, or a 
third one able to recover the results of both previous theories. We are going to 
find an example of this situation in the next section.
A model of filmic viewer
As we mentioned in the first part of this introduction, the encounter between 
film theory and empirical sciences implies convergence of research programs 
whose models are often commensurable but not always compatible; as a result, 
we detect the occurrence of conflicts that could undermine the project of a uni-
fied framework, and that should be consequently overcome by applying the epis-
temological principles introduced above. 
A first point of conflict is the model of viewer assumed and implemented by re-
search programs. On the one hand we find viewer-as-mind models whose centre 
of gravity is represented by cognitive processes, related both to perceptive and 
emotional ones (the latter enhanced by the models of “hot cognition”). On the 
other hand we find viewer-as-body models, whose centre of gravity is constituted 
by sensitive, affective and motor processes. Moreover, viewer-as-mind models 
tend to highlight top-down mental mechanisms, while viewer-as-body ones ac-
centuate the role of bottom-up processes.
In our view Neurofilmology should solve this opposition by assuming the 
model of the viewer-as-body, yet radicalising it in a new model that we call the 
viewer-as-organism.30 The key difference compared to both the previous mod-
els is that viewer-as-organism are not already given before and independently 
from the film experience as a well defined entity, but constitute themselves in 
the course of this very experience, in complex, dynamical and provisional forms.
Indeed, the viewer-as-organism handles simultaneously many processes of dif-
ferent nature (sensory, perceptual, cognitive, emotional, motor, active, mnemon-
ic), within different time windows; they are constantly striving to coordinate the 
29 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 4th ed., with an Introductory Essay by Ian 
Hacking, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago-London 2012.
30 We could say that the 4EA model of subject, intended as “embodied, embedded, enacted, 
extended, and affective” (John Protevi, Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic, 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 2009, p. 4) should be replaced by a 5EAR model, 
envisioning the subject as embodied, embedded, enacted, extended, emerging, affective and re-
lational. For a survey of the debate on these issues we refer to Shaun Gallagher, Dan Zahavi, The 
Phenomenological Mind. An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science, Routledge, 
London-New York 2008.
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first and synchronize the latter. To achieve these goals, they produce progressive 
synthetic configurations, following a spiral-shaped dynamic: both perceptual in-
put and already owned resources are used to constitute new configurations that 
in turn become resources potentially available for new processing.31 We can call 
“interpretation” this ongoing and unfolding dynamic. Configurations gradually 
produced are homeodynamic, since they tend to stable forms of self-organization 
yet constantly open to redefinition; some of them are related to the very subjects, 
which are therefore not given a priori but emerging from this process.
The assumption of the viewer-as-organism model allows Neurofilmology to 
overcome the opposition between the viewer-as-mind and viewer-as-body mod-
els. Indeed, the different processes in which the viewer is involved within differ-
ent time windows (whether they are sensitive, perceptual, cognitive, emotional, 
motor-active, and so on) are to be considered on the same plane, while the focus 
shifts from the singular processes to the logic and patterns of their interactions 
within the interpretative dynamic. As a consequence, the alternative flows of 
top-down and bottom-up processes are reconfigured as a network of recipro-
cal determinations between current and memory resources within the “on line” 
dynamic of interpretation.
A model of filmic situation
The second opposition threatening the filmological project concerns models 
of the film viewing situation; in this case, we find a competition between a socio-
cultural and a naturalistic definition of such situation. There are two accounts of 
this opposition, a radical and a moderate one.
The radical version addresses the ontological foundation of the film viewing 
situation. Indeed, the culturalist position states that the set of capacities, dis-
positions and preferences of the film viewer result from cultural transmission 
and social learning: consequently, the filmic situation is essentially socio-cultural. 
Conversely, the naturalist position argues that perceptual, cognitive and affective 
capabilities as well as dispositions and preferences necessary for film viewing, 
emerged under natural selection in the Pleistocene era: therefore, they are part 
of film viewer’s biological heritage, and as such they are completely innate and 
universal; consequently, the vision of the film is an essentially natural situation.
The naturalistic account can be understood as a reaction to the strong domain 
of culturalism represented by the Grand-Theory during the seventies.32 How-
31 The term “configuration” does not refer to a “representation” of states-of-things, and it rather 
implies a reciprocal relationship between affection and expression: the viewers experience directly 
a certain state-of-things, express it to their selves, and through this expression they change and 
reconfigure in turn their very experience.
32 A reconstruction of these reasons is Joseph Anderson, Barbara Anderson, Introduction, in Id. 
(eds.), Narration and Spectatorship in Moving Images: Perception, Imagination, Emotion, Cam-
bridge Scholar Press, Newcastle 2007, pp. 1-14.
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ever, naturalistic scholars do nothing but recover and reverse the culturalist argu-
ment, without exceeding an abstract opposition between nature and culture. On 
the contrary, it seems clear today that the genetic makeup and, consequently, the 
physical and mental conformation of individuals, are not absolute constraints; 
rather, they must be conceived of as fields of possibilities well defined but open 
to multiple forms of adaptation, exaptation, learning, invention and reinvention, 
on the basis of the encounter of the organism with the world and the possible 
technological manipulations of the latter. In this respect, cinema is an excellent 
example: a technological device for delivering moving images and sounds be-
comes a dispositive that, starting from the physical and psychological capacities 
of the subjects involved, allows them to experiment with the limits and possibili-
ties of those dispositions, within specific cultural and historical conditions. 
In a different way, the moderate version of the opposition between naturalism 
and culturalism focuses on the degree of continuity or discontinuity between filmic 
situation and those of ordinary life: in this case, the culturalist position accentu-
ates the discontinuity, while the naturalist one tends to read the filmic situation 
as an “extension by other means” of ordinary life experience.
On the basis of our previous argument, we cannot help taking on this point 
a position that tends toward the culturalist. On the one hand, we must admit 
that ordinary life dispositions and capabilities (such as the sensory and percep-
tual grasping of objects and spaces, the recognition of events and their narrative 
organization, the understanding and sharing of mental and emotional states of 
other subjects, and so on) are re-enacted during the film experience. On the oth-
er hand, however, there is no doubt that this is done within a technological and 
cultural dispositive and through the use of stylistic and narrative forms linked to 
specific historical periods; that this very dispositive was and is subject to transfor-
mations and “relocations” (visions of film on television sets, PCs, tablets, mobile 
phones, and even film viewing situations within neurological laboratories);33 and 
finally that the filmic experience is not simply guided, contrived and constrained 
by the audiovisual materials provided by the dispositive, but it is far more radi-
cally designed on the basis of whole project.
We can therefore speak of a (relative) discontinuity of filmic experience from 
ordinary life experience; this statement is relevant for two epistemological rea-
sons. First, this issue entails the raison d’être of film studies as specific research 
program: indeed, if we assume that the filmic situation represents an entirely nat-
ural kind of experience, without any pertinent gap from ordinary life, then film 
studies would be reabsorbed in a general examination (whether neurological, 
psychological, phenomenological, and so on) of the human experience.34 Sec-
ond, if we assume that filmic experience is not just contrived, but more radically 
designed by the movie materials, we should integrate neurofilmological studies 
33 Francesco Casetti, The Lumière Galaxy, Columbia University Press, New York 2015.
34 A similar argument has been advanced (in a more specific context) by Malcolm Turvey,  Evolu-
tionary Film Theory, in Ted Nannicelli, Paul Taberham, Cognitive Media Theory, cit., ch. 3.
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with a discipline that would be able to rebuild the projects of experience on the 
basis of a close analysis of filmic materials: we are thinking to a neo-semiotics, no 
longer tied to topics such as signs, language, text or discourse, but rather radi-
cally reconfigured as an analysis of the filmic experience design.35
 
A model of filmic experience
Previous considerations on the models of film viewer and situation converge 
within a model of filmic experience. We intend to suggest that such a model, 
though simplified, should constitute a conceptual framework for Neurofilmol-
ogy: therefore, it should allow us both to frame current trends of research, and 
to highlight new areas of interest currently uncovered (or scarcely covered) by 
research activities.
The construction of our model is based on two basic assumptions. First, the 
experience in general is based on three levels of configurations: the sensory scan-
ning and qualification of inputs, the narrative scanning and sorting of perceived 
events, the relational scanning of and tuning with other subjects. In fact, we can 
notice a logical progression between the three levels; in particular the transition 
from the first to the second level introduces a distinction between the subject and 
a field of entities (i.e. objects and subjects composing a world). Second, the filmic 
experience entails not only one field of entities (as ordinary experience) but three 
distinct fields of objects and subjects: the world directly perceived (i.e. the “or-
dinary world”), the field of sensory materials provided by the dispositive (i.e. 
the “discourse”), and the world perceived indirectly (i.e. the “diegetic world,” 
whether fictional or factual). On this basis, the model of film experience will be 
articulated in seven joints, each of which corresponds to a relatively autonomous, 
whether actual or possible, research area.36
The (multi)sensory scanning and the qualitative notation of the sensorial input: 
the viewers “feel” a series of sensations without a clear distinction neither be-
tween the inner and the outer world, nor between the different sensory modal-
ity. We can retrieve here the research findings regarding the “multi” and “inter-
sensorial” aspects of film experience (including proprioceptive and interoceptive 
modality: see for instance Maarten Coëgnarts and Peter Kravanja’s essay in this 
issue), as well as philosophical suggestions from the Deleuzian “logic of sensa-
tions” and its neurological and psychological counterparts. 
The narrative sorting of the diegetic world: on the basis of the recognition 
35 Ruggero Eugeni, Semiotica dei media. Le forme dell’esperienza, Carocci, Roma 2010. The pres-
ence of a design of the experience does not entail the assumption of its automatic and deterministic 
effectiveness within filmic situations: on this sensitive problem see both Temenuga Trifonova’s and 
Maria Poulaki’s contributions to this issue.
36 Given the impossibility of a full account of different research areas, we refer to the readers sig-
naled in the first part of this Introduction.
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of different fields of objects and subject, the viewers notice and follow what’s 
happening in the indirect world by gaining a living experience of it. While 
the viewer’s perception is already a well developed object of film studies, new 
models of online narrative experience based on the concepts of “event recogni-
tion” and “nowness” are still emerging (see for instance Pia Tikka and Mauri 
Kaipainen’s essay in this issue). 
The narrative sorting of the discourse: viewers give sense to the presence of 
sensory materials provided by cinematic devices by articulating them in (a) a flow 
of ongoing discursive production, (b) a plot unfolding and re-working the story 
line and (c) a format with a material extension into the space and time. This is 
a relatively new and poorly covered field of research, but recent studies on the 
perception of filmic stylistic figures are producing very interesting findings (as 
Vittorio Gallese and Michele Guerra show in their essay for this issue). 
The narrative sorting of the ordinary/surrounding world: viewers check and de-
tect the existing relationships between their own situated activity and the dieget-
ic world: these relationships can be of continuity (in the case of factual media ex-
perience) or discontinuity (in the case of fictional media experience), with many 
intermediate solutions (like for instance the different forms of  “diegetisation of 
the dispositive”). In this field we can find new studies on spatial perception and 
on the managing of spatial situatedness by the viewer (for instance in the case of 
videogames and the viewer’s immersiveness implied), as well as a focus on the 
“ecological” role of dispositive within the media experience. 
The relational tuning with the subjects of the diegetic world: viewers notice the 
presence within the diegetic world of other subjects (i.e. entities developing and 
manifesting a living experience comparable to the viewers one), and the possi-
bility of understanding them and in case sharing experiences with them. This is 
one of the most covered fields of neurofilmological studies, with a great extent 
of studies about “sympathy,” “empathy” and other “relational emotions;” more 
recently a number of scholars outlined the strict relation between cognitive and 
emotional/embodied processes in this regard (see Patricia Pisters’s and Enrico 
Carocci’s essays in this issue). 
The relational tuning with the subjects of discourse: viewers feel the presence 
of an ongoing activity of audiovisual “writing,” recognize the style of “speaking” 
subjects, and establish a relation of trust and confidence (or distrust and lack of 
confidence) with them. This is a less considered research area, partially covered 
by the studies mentioned at the point E. We can however retrieve on this point 
the “neuroaesthetical” approaches to cinema (see for instance Temenuga Tri-
fonova’s essay in this issue). 
The relational tuning with the subjects of the ordinary/surrounding world: the 
viewers feel the presence of other subjects around him, or in any case located 
within the same ordinary world; film experience becomes the living experience 
of the spring of social bonds (Georg Simmel’s “sociability”). We find occasional 
reference to this potential area of interests – which is in any case implied by the 
research on intersubjective correlations/synchronization of audience members’ 
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neural activity (see for example Maria Poulaki’s essay in this issue) – but we still 
lack strong investments.37
An overview of this special issue 
This special issue aims to evaluate, from a multidisciplinary and critical per-
spective, both the relevance of the neurological approach for the psychology 
and the aesthetics of the film experience and, more generally, the epistemologi-
cal consequences of this approach in the humanities, assuming that the borders 
between these models are permeable and that a convergence would be desirable 
and of advantage for audiovisual studies. 
A first group of contributions critically discuss neurocinematics. In her essay, 
Temenuga Trifonova argues that, although rooted in neuroscience (i.e. a quantita-
tive assessment of the impact of different art and film styles on viewers’ brains) 
rather than in ideological, linguistic and psychoanalytic models (i.e. subject-posi-
tioning “Grand-theories”), neurocinematics is an extension of apparatus theory 
for its positioning the subject in function of the architecture of their brains. Ac-
cordingly, even what the subject unconsciously experiences of a film is part of the 
interpretation process of visual stimuli. In this sense, neuroaesthetics bridge the 
“hermeneutic gap” between (low) perception and (high) interpretation of stimuli.
Although she adopts a different (cognitivist) theoretical framework, Maria 
Poulaki also gives salience to notions of control and attention, i.e. the “effec-
tiveness” of the film in predicting and driving the mental activity of the viewer. 
Adopting a complex-system theory, the author discusses the ISC (inter-subject 
correlation) experimental method – that helps to assess the similarities/differ-
ences in brain activity across viewers, looking at common patterns of response 
time courses in different brain regions. Nevertheless, in the end Poulaki de-
parts from cognitivist hypotheses of a unique interpretation of film meaning and 
claims that the notion of control indicates that also the stimulus can be multiple, 
not only the interpretation.
A second group of essays share the attempt to conciliate of the opposition be-
tween cognition/emotion, or mind/body. Patricia Pisters offers an application of 
her own notion of “neuro-image” to television series Dexter and convincingly de-
scribes Neurofilmology as a terrain of fertile encounter between apparent distant 
perspectives such as analytical philosophy/cognitivist film theory and continen-
tal philosophy/phenomenology of the film experience. As Pisters writes, “Since 
important branches of contemporary neuroscience emphasize the significant role 
37 Obviously the seven areas, still relatively autonomous, are nonetheless mutually interrelated and 
determined: for example there is a close link between the understanding of characters mental sta-
tes (E) and the modulation of situations and events (B); or between some set of recurring sensory 
patterns (A) and the recognition of an “author” (F).
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of embodiment in any kind of processes of the brain,” it is time to overcome the 
classic division between mind/cognition versus body/phenomenological.
On the same line of thought, Enrico Carocci argues that the tensions between 
the quantitative and qualitative approaches corresponds to the clash between the 
third-person – empirical – perspective and the first-person – phenomenological – 
perspective. In order to overcome this bias, the author relies on Jaak Panksepp’s 
notion of selfhood and focuses on affective neuroscience as a valuable framework 
for empirical investigations of the qualities of cinematic emotional experience, 
for its providing important theoretical insights and empirical evidences for the 
study of the subjective (or first-person) dimension of emotional experience from 
a naturalistic point of view.
The relevance of an embodied approach to the mental experience of audiovisual 
media inspired also Maarten Coëgnarts and Peter Kravanja’s essay. Departing from 
a cognitivist “disembodied” perspective, and relating recent neuroscientific evi-
dence from cognitive linguistics, the authors claim that the sensory-motor system 
plays a constitutive role in the cinematic characterization of abstract concepts, as 
well as in language. Two of Stanley Kubrick’s films serve as case studies for under-
lying conceptual and metaphorical design which is inherently embodied.
The project of a new multidisciplinary approach to the film experience would 
remain unproductive if not concretely applied to film aesthetics and viewer par-
ticipation. More than metaphorically conceivable as an experimental laboratory 
setting, the film experience offers a space for testing narrative and formal solu-
tions that provide, control and regulate sensory-motor activation and emotional 
involvement. A third group of contributions in this special issue reports empiri-
cal experiments and discuss their relevance for new approach to film style, narra-
tion, and spectatorship. In their essay – based on Husserl’s concepts of retention 
and protention and on Francisco Varela’s neurophenomenological exploration 
of time consciousness – Pia Tikka and Mauri Kaipainen argue that film nar-
ratives are intrinsically time-dependent designs. Their contribution proposes a 
model of “nowness” relating this to the neural epiphenomena of narrative expe-
rience, in connection with other researches conducted by the group aivoAALTO 
at University Finland on enactive cinema, a model that assumes changes in the 
psychophysiological reactions of participants (enactors) to represent implicit and 
unconscious reactions of the mind and determine the changes made to the nar-
rative presentation in real-time.38
The empirical studies reported in Vittorio Gallese and Michele Guerra’s essay 
describe an innovative experiment that uses a combined behavioural and high 
density EEG experiment to determine whether various types of camera move-
ments, more or less simulating an observer’s own movement toward the observed 
38 Pia Tikka, Aleksander Väljamäe, Aline W. de Borst, Roberto Pugliese, Niklas Ravaja, Mauri Kai-
painen, Tapio Takala, “Enactive Cinema Paves Way for Understanding Complex Real-Time Social 
Interaction in Neuroimaging Experiments,” in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, vol. 6, Art. 298 
(2012), pp. 1-6.
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acting agent, might modulate observers’ mirror mechanism. Their findings pro-
vide evidence that the steadicam determines stronger viewers’ brain activation in 
respect to other camera movements (e.g., dolly or zoom-in). This contribution 
provides empirical ground to the notion of the capacity of the camera to simulate 
the virtual presence of the viewers inside the movie.
We would also like to invite readers to consult the Projects & Abstracts section, 
in which PhD projects in the field of Neurofilmology are presented.
